Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation
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Cites work
- A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
- Indirect reciprocity among imperfect individuals
- Reactive strategies in indirect reciprocity
- Social Norms and Community Enforcement
- The good, the bad and the discriminator -- errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
- The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
- The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
Cited in
(28)- Convergence of reputations under indirect reciprocity
- Indirect reciprocity with trinary reputations
- Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions
- Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity
- The evolution of cooperation and diversity under integrated indirect reciprocity
- Hidden patterns of reciprocity
- Evolving cooperation
- Learn good from bad: effects of good and bad neighbors in spatial prisoners' dilemma games
- A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity
- The evolutionary game of emotions considering the influence of reputation
- The evolution of reputation-based cooperation in regular networks
- The evolutionary advantage of limited network knowledge
- The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
- Gossip: Perspective taking to establish cooperation
- Limited memory can be beneficial for the evolution of cooperation
- A solution for private assessment in indirect reciprocity using solitary observation
- Evolutionary game theory meets social science: is there a unifying rule for human cooperation?
- Indirect reciprocity in three types of social dilemmas
- Three-person game facilitates indirect reciprocity under image scoring
- A model for gossip-mediated evolution of altruism with various types of false information by speakers and assessment by listeners
- The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity
- Evolutionary stability of first-order-information indirect reciprocity in sizable groups
- Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity
- The conflict of social norms may cause the collapse of cooperation: indirect reciprocity with opposing attitudes towards in-group favoritism
- Ingroup favoritism and intergroup cooperation under indirect reciprocity based on group reputation
- Participation costs can suppress the evolution of upstream reciprocity
- Complexity of behavioural strategies and cooperation in the optional public goods game
- Linkage based on the \textit{kandori} norm successfully sustains cooperation in social dilemmas
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