Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2006.08.018zbMATH Open1450.91005OpenAlexW2054345477WikidataQ57065348 ScholiaQ57065348MaRDI QIDQ2209130FDOQ2209130

Authors: Hisashi Ohtsuki, Yoh Iwasa 

Publication date: 28 October 2020

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.08.018

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• The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
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zbMATH Keywords

reputationdiscriminatorreplicator dynamicsindirect reciprocityexhaustive searchnorms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Evolutionary games (91A22) Social and behavioral sciences: general topics (91C99)

Cites Work

• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
• Indirect reciprocity among imperfect individuals
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
• The good, the bad and the discriminator -- errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
• The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Reactive strategies in indirect reciprocity

Cited In (28)

• The evolution of cooperation and diversity under integrated indirect reciprocity
• The evolutionary game of emotions considering the influence of reputation
• Evolving cooperation
• Hidden patterns of reciprocity
• Ingroup favoritism and intergroup cooperation under indirect reciprocity based on group reputation
• Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity
• A model for gossip-mediated evolution of altruism with various types of false information by speakers and assessment by listeners
• The evolution of reputation-based cooperation in regular networks
• The evolutionary advantage of limited network knowledge
• A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity
• Learn good from bad: effects of good and bad neighbors in spatial prisoners' dilemma games
• Limited memory can be beneficial for the evolution of cooperation
• The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity
• Evolutionary stability of first-order-information indirect reciprocity in sizable groups
• Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity
• Participation costs can suppress the evolution of upstream reciprocity
• Evolutionary game theory meets social science: is there a unifying rule for human cooperation?
• The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
• Three-person game facilitates indirect reciprocity under image scoring
• Indirect reciprocity with trinary reputations
• Indirect reciprocity in three types of social dilemmas
• Linkage based on the \textit{kandori} norm successfully sustains cooperation in social dilemmas
• Convergence of reputations under indirect reciprocity
• Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions
• Gossip: Perspective taking to establish cooperation
• The conflict of social norms may cause the collapse of cooperation: indirect reciprocity with opposing attitudes towards in-group favoritism
• Complexity of behavioural strategies and cooperation in the optional public goods game
• A solution for private assessment in indirect reciprocity using solitary observation

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