Indirect reciprocity with trinary reputations

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2012.10.031MaRDI QIDQ2013281zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Shoma Tanabe, Hideyuki Suzuki, Naoki Masuda

Publication date 17 August 2017

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1205.3547

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationaltruismsocial normindirect reciprocity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Abstract: Indirect reciprocity is a reputation-based mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations when individuals do not repeatedly meet. The conditions under which cooperation based on indirect reciprocity occurs have been examined in great details. Most previous theoretical analysis assumed for mathematical tractability that an individual possesses a binary reputation value, i.e., good or bad, which depends on their past actions and other factors. However, in real situations, reputations of individuals may be multiple valued. Another puzzling discrepancy between the theory and experiments is the status of the so-called image scoring, in which cooperation and defection are judged to be good and bad, respectively, independent of other factors. Such an assessment rule is found in behavioral experiments, whereas it is known to be unstable in theory. In the present study, we fill both gaps by analyzing a trinary reputation model. By an exhaustive search, we identify all the cooperative and stable equilibria composed of a homogeneous population or a heterogeneous population containing two types of players. Some results derived for the trinary reputation model are direct extensions of those for the binary model. However, we find that the trinary model allows cooperation under image scoring under some mild conditions.

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Cites work

• A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
• Evolution of indirect reciprocity by social information: the role of trust and reputation in evolution of altruism
• Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• Indirect reciprocity among imperfect individuals
• Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game
• Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity
• Reactive strategies in indirect reciprocity
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• The good, the bad and the discriminator -- errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
• The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
• The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation

Cited in

(16)

• Convergence of reputations under indirect reciprocity
• Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions
• Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity
• A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity
• The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
• The evolutionary game of emotions considering the influence of reputation
• Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions and private information
• On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information
• Value homophily benefits cooperation but motivates employing incorrect social information
• Indirect reciprocity in three types of social dilemmas
• Three-person game facilitates indirect reciprocity under image scoring
• A model for gossip-mediated evolution of altruism with various types of false information by speakers and assessment by listeners
• A second-order stability analysis for the continuous model of indirect reciprocity
• Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity
• Ingroup favoritism and intergroup cooperation under indirect reciprocity based on group reputation
• Corrigendum to ``Indirect reciprocity with trinary reputations

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