Indirect reciprocity with trinary reputations
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Publication:2013281
DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2012.10.031zbMATH Open1368.91034arXiv1205.3547OpenAlexW2111767253WikidataQ50550352 ScholiaQ50550352MaRDI QIDQ2013281FDOQ2013281
Authors: Shoma Tanabe, Hideyuki Suzuki, Naoki Masuda 
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: Indirect reciprocity is a reputation-based mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations when individuals do not repeatedly meet. The conditions under which cooperation based on indirect reciprocity occurs have been examined in great details. Most previous theoretical analysis assumed for mathematical tractability that an individual possesses a binary reputation value, i.e., good or bad, which depends on their past actions and other factors. However, in real situations, reputations of individuals may be multiple valued. Another puzzling discrepancy between the theory and experiments is the status of the so-called image scoring, in which cooperation and defection are judged to be good and bad, respectively, independent of other factors. Such an assessment rule is found in behavioral experiments, whereas it is known to be unstable in theory. In the present study, we fill both gaps by analyzing a trinary reputation model. By an exhaustive search, we identify all the cooperative and stable equilibria composed of a homogeneous population or a heterogeneous population containing two types of players. Some results derived for the trinary reputation model are direct extensions of those for the binary model. However, we find that the trinary model allows cooperation under image scoring under some mild conditions.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1205.3547
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Cites Work
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- On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information
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- A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity
- Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions and private information
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- Indirect reciprocity in three types of social dilemmas
- Convergence of reputations under indirect reciprocity
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- Value homophily benefits cooperation but motivates employing incorrect social information
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