Indirect reciprocity in three types of social dilemmas

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2014.03.035MaRDI QIDQ890679zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Mitsuhiro Nakamura, Hisashi Ohtsuki

Publication date 11 November 2015

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ir.soken.ac.jp/?action=repository_action_common_download&item_id=5410&item_no=1&attribute_id=22&file_no=1

zbMATH Keywords

reputationevolutionary game theoryprisoner's dilemma gamesnowdrift gamestag hunt game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22) Social and behavioral sciences: general topics (91C99)

Recommendations

• The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
• Two wrongs don't make a right: the initial viability of different assessment rules in the evolution of indirect reciprocity
• The conflict of social norms may cause the collapse of cooperation: indirect reciprocity with opposing attitudes towards in-group favoritism
• The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity
• How the indirect reciprocity with co-evolving norm and strategy for \(2\times 2\) prisoner's dilemma game works for emerging cooperation

Cites work

• A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
• Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity
• Evolution of indirect reciprocity in groups of various sizes and comparison with direct reciprocity
• Evolutionary stability of first-order-information indirect reciprocity in sizable groups
• Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• Indirect reciprocity among imperfect individuals
• Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game
• Indirect reciprocity with trinary reputations
• Ingroup favoritism and intergroup cooperation under indirect reciprocity based on group reputation
• Learning dynamics in social dilemmas
• Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• The calculus of selfishness.
• The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity
• The evolution of norms
• The good, the bad and the discriminator -- errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
• The importance of subjectivity in perceptual errors on the emergence of indirect reciprocity
• The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
• The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
• Two wrongs don't make a right: the initial viability of different assessment rules in the evolution of indirect reciprocity

Cited in

(9)

• How the indirect reciprocity with co-evolving norm and strategy for \(2\times 2\) prisoner's dilemma game works for emerging cooperation
• Reactive strategies in indirect reciprocity
• The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity
• Erratum to: ``Indirect reciprocity in three types of social dilemmas
• The good, the bad and the discriminator -- errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
• The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
• Linkage based on the \textit{kandori} norm successfully sustains cooperation in social dilemmas
• The conflict of social norms may cause the collapse of cooperation: indirect reciprocity with opposing attitudes towards in-group favoritism
• A solution for private assessment in indirect reciprocity using solitary observation

This page was built for publication: Indirect reciprocity in three types of social dilemmas

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q890679)