The conflict of social norms may cause the collapse of cooperation: indirect reciprocity with opposing attitudes towards in-group favoritism
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Publication:2632585
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.12.018zbMath1412.91010OpenAlexW2078863537WikidataQ44908515 ScholiaQ44908515MaRDI QIDQ2632585
Tadasu Matsuo, Marko Jusup, Yoh Iwasa
Publication date: 15 May 2019
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.12.018
Related Items (5)
Large group size promotes the evolution of cooperation in the mutual-aid game ⋮ Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions and private information ⋮ Value homophily benefits cooperation but motivates employing incorrect social information ⋮ Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation ⋮ Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions
Cites Work
- Ingroup favoritism and intergroup cooperation under indirect reciprocity based on group reputation
- The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity
- A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
- How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
- The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
- Reactive strategies in indirect reciprocity
- The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
- The importance of subjectivity in perceptual errors on the emergence of indirect reciprocity
- Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation
- Social Norms and Community Enforcement
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