The importance of subjectivity in perceptual errors on the emergence of indirect reciprocity
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Publication:2202393
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.05.014zbMath1447.91081OpenAlexW2083284029WikidataQ80099231 ScholiaQ80099231MaRDI QIDQ2202393
Rie Mashima, Nobuyuki Takahashi
Publication date: 18 September 2020
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2115/17153
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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Cites Work
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- A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
- How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
- The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
- Reactive strategies in indirect reciprocity
- The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
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