Value homophily benefits cooperation but motivates employing incorrect social information
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2415789
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.11.023zbMath1412.92330OpenAlexW2052500026WikidataQ47699622 ScholiaQ47699622MaRDI QIDQ2415789
Dominic Mitchell, Joanna J. Bryson, Paul Rauwolf
Publication date: 23 May 2019
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://opus.bath.ac.uk/42094/1/RauwolfMitchellBryson.pdf
Related Items (2)
A model for gossip-mediated evolution of altruism with various types of false information by speakers and assessment by listeners ⋮ Will any gossip do? Gossip does not need to be perfectly accurate to promote trust
Cites Work
- Ingroup favoritism and intergroup cooperation under indirect reciprocity based on group reputation
- Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity
- The donation game with roles played between relatives
- The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity
- Indirect reciprocity with trinary reputations
- A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
- Indirect reciprocity among imperfect individuals
- How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
- The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
- The importance of subjectivity in perceptual errors on the emergence of indirect reciprocity
- Two wrongs don't make a right: the initial viability of different assessment rules in the evolution of indirect reciprocity
- The conflict of social norms may cause the collapse of cooperation: indirect reciprocity with opposing attitudes towards in-group favoritism
- The Evolution of Cooperation
- Why Copy Others? Insights from the Social Learning Strategies Tournament
- Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets
- Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games
- From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
This page was built for publication: Value homophily benefits cooperation but motivates employing incorrect social information
