Ingroup favoritism and intergroup cooperation under indirect reciprocity based on group reputation

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.07.002zbMath1337.91023arXiv1205.2825OpenAlexW2144593781WikidataQ50569175 ScholiaQ50569175MaRDI QIDQ293725

Naoki Masuda

Publication date: 9 June 2016

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1205.2825

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationcommunityindirect reciprocityoutgroup homogeneity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Cooperative games (91A12) Evolutionary games (91A22) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items

Promotion of cooperation induced by discriminators in the spatial multi-player donor-recipient game ⋮ Emergence of parochial altruism in well-mixed populations ⋮ The conflict of social norms may cause the collapse of cooperation: indirect reciprocity with opposing attitudes towards in-group favoritism ⋮ Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity ⋮ Prejudice, privilege, and power: conflicts and cooperation between recognizable groups ⋮ Value homophily benefits cooperation but motivates employing incorrect social information ⋮ Indirect reciprocity in three types of social dilemmas ⋮ A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Effects of information and group structure on evolution of altruism: analysis of two-score model by covariance and contextual analyses
• Mechanisms for similarity based cooperation
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• The good, the bad and the discriminator -- errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
• The evolution of norms
• Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation
• Evolution of cooperation by phenotypic similarity