Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity

DOI10.1016/j.chaos.2013.08.006zbMath1348.91046arXiv1308.3025OpenAlexW2115290223MaRDI QIDQ336287

Satoshi Uchida, Tatsuya Sasaki

Publication date: 10 November 2016

Published in: Chaos, Solitons and Fractals (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1308.3025

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (11)

The impact of expressing willingness to cooperate on cooperation in public goods game ⋮ Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions and private information ⋮ A second-order stability analysis for the continuous model of indirect reciprocity ⋮ The emergence and implementation of pool exclusion in spatial public goods game with heterogeneous ability-to-pay ⋮ Value homophily benefits cooperation but motivates employing incorrect social information ⋮ Indirect reciprocity in three types of social dilemmas ⋮ A solution for private assessment in indirect reciprocity using solitary observation ⋮ Hybrid assessment scheme based on the stern-judging rule for maintaining cooperation under indirect reciprocity ⋮ A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity ⋮ Probabilistic punishment and reward under rule of trust-based decision-making in continuous public goods game ⋮ Indirect reciprocity with optional games and monitoring of interactions between defectors

Cites Work

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• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
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• The evolution of norms
• The importance of subjectivity in perceptual errors on the emergence of indirect reciprocity
• Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• The Calculus of Selfishness

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