A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
This article has shown that indirect reciprocity cannot be based on an image evaluation strategy when errors are accounted for. To understand the evolution of human cooperation, new models are needed that go beyond mutual altruism. The authors reanalyze the indirect reciprocity model presented by \textit{M. A. Nowak} and \textit{K. Sigmund} [``The dynamics of indirect reciprocity, J. Theor. Biol. 194, No. 4, 561--574 (1998; \url{doi:10.1006/jtbi.1998.0775})], which represents an important step in this direction. It touches on unique aspects of human sociality that previous models could not grasp. However, as the authors of the article show, if such a process as indirect reciprocity developed, and the reputation was binary (good or bad), it could not be based on an image assessment strategy. Two new persistent strategies are analyzed, showing that it is not important that people take their own situation into account when deciding on a course of action. However, it is imperative that people can distinguish motivation from observed apostasy. The question arises as to how people distinguish this. In systems of mutual altruism, organisms can track the actions of their partners through direct observation, and therefore systems of indirect reciprocity are very sensitive to the availability of information.
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6001708
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