A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
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Publication:2177334
DOI10.1016/S0022-5193(03)00154-1zbMATH Open1465.92077OpenAlexW1979970001WikidataQ43483864 ScholiaQ43483864MaRDI QIDQ2177334FDOQ2177334
Authors: Karthik Panchanathan, Robert W. Boyd 
Publication date: 6 May 2020
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-5193(03)00154-1
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Cites Work
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