Two wrongs don't make a right: the initial viability of different assessment rules in the evolution of indirect reciprocity

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.02.009zbMath1405.91040OpenAlexW2155402406WikidataQ46462981 ScholiaQ46462981MaRDI QIDQ2413868

Karthik Panchanathan

Publication date: 17 September 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.02.009

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationmoralityindirect reciprocity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (6)

Value homophily benefits cooperation but motivates employing incorrect social information ⋮ Indirect reciprocity in three types of social dilemmas ⋮ A solution for private assessment in indirect reciprocity using solitary observation ⋮ Hybrid assessment scheme based on the stern-judging rule for maintaining cooperation under indirect reciprocity ⋮ A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity ⋮ Limited memory can be beneficial for the evolution of cooperation

Cites Work

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• Evolution of generous cooperative norms by cultural group selection
• The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity
• A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
• The evolution of norms
• The importance of subjectivity in perceptual errors on the emergence of indirect reciprocity
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement

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