Evolution of generous cooperative norms by cultural group selection

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2008.12.022MaRDI QIDQ1617596zbMATHOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors István Scheuring

Publication date 8 November 2018

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.12.022

zbMATH Keywords

group selectionsocial normhuman cooperationindirect altruismsecond-order information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Problems related to evolution (92D15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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• The evolution of norms
• Evolution of norms in a multi-level selection model of conflict and cooperation
• Social norms and the indirect evolution of conditional cooperation
• How the indirect reciprocity with co-evolving norm and strategy for \(2\times 2\) prisoner's dilemma game works for emerging cooperation
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1189213

Cites work

• A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
• Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• The co-evolution of individual behaviors and social institutions
• The evolution of cooperation
• The evolution of norms
• The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations
• The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
• The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation

Cited in

(12)

• The evolution of norms
• The co-evolution of individual behaviors and social institutions
• The evolution of reciprocity in sizable human groups
• How the indirect reciprocity with co-evolving norm and strategy for \(2\times 2\) prisoner's dilemma game works for emerging cooperation
• Two wrongs don't make a right: the initial viability of different assessment rules in the evolution of indirect reciprocity
• Evolutionary game theory meets social science: is there a unifying rule for human cooperation?
• The hitchhiker's guide to altruism: gene-culture coevolution, and the internalization of norms
• The co-evolution of culturally inherited altruistic helping and cultural transmission under random group formation
• Evolution of norms in a multi-level selection model of conflict and cooperation
• Social norms and the indirect evolution of conditional cooperation
• Cooperation, norms, and gene-culture coevolution
• Under multilevel selection: ``When shall you be neither spiteful nor envious?

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