Evolution of generous cooperative norms by cultural group selection
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Publication:1617596
DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2008.12.022zbMATH Open1400.92377OpenAlexW2128905019WikidataQ51669845 ScholiaQ51669845MaRDI QIDQ1617596FDOQ1617596
Authors: István Scheuring
Publication date: 8 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.12.022
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Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Problems related to evolution (92D15) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Cites Work
- The evolution of cooperation
- The co-evolution of individual behaviors and social institutions
- A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
- How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
- The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
- The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
- The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations
- Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity
- The evolution of norms
Cited In (11)
- Social norms and the indirect evolution of conditional cooperation
- Two wrongs don't make a right: the initial viability of different assessment rules in the evolution of indirect reciprocity
- Evolution of norms in a multi-level selection model of conflict and cooperation
- Under multilevel selection: ``When shall you be neither spiteful nor envious?
- The evolution of reciprocity in sizable human groups
- How the indirect reciprocity with co-evolving norm and strategy for \(2\times 2\) prisoner's dilemma game works for emerging cooperation
- The hitchhiker's guide to altruism: gene-culture coevolution, and the internalization of norms
- The co-evolution of culturally inherited altruistic helping and cultural transmission under random group formation
- Evolutionary game theory meets social science: is there a unifying rule for human cooperation?
- The co-evolution of individual behaviors and social institutions
- The evolution of norms
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