Evolution of generous cooperative norms by cultural group selection

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.12.022zbMath1400.92377OpenAlexW2128905019WikidataQ51669845 ScholiaQ51669845MaRDI QIDQ1617596

István Scheuring

Publication date: 8 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.12.022

zbMATH Keywords

group selectionsocial normhuman cooperationindirect altruismsecond-order information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites Work

• The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations
• Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity
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• A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
• The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
• The evolution of norms
• The Evolution of Cooperation