Under multilevel selection: ``When shall you be neither spiteful nor envious?
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Publication:2632346
DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2013.08.031zbMATH Open1411.92208OpenAlexW2073221261WikidataQ45771978 ScholiaQ45771978MaRDI QIDQ2632346FDOQ2632346
Authors: József Garay, Villő Csiszár, Tamás F. Móri
Publication date: 14 May 2019
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.08.031
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Cites Work
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- Survivor's dilemma: defend the group or flee?
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