Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity

DOI10.1007/s11538-008-9305-6zbMath1144.92035WikidataQ41873628 ScholiaQ41873628MaRDI QIDQ941146

Martin A. Nowak, Arne Traulsen, Noam Shoresh

Publication date: 4 September 2008

Published in: Bulletin of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11538-008-9305-6

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic effects; evolutionary game theory; group selection; metapopulations; strong selection; Moran process

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

92D15: Problems related to evolution

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

91A22: Evolutionary games

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