Evolution of worker policing

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2016.03.001zbMATH Open1347.92113arXiv1603.05293OpenAlexW2294055973WikidataQ50225511 ScholiaQ50225511MaRDI QIDQ327210FDOQ327210

Authors: Jason W. Olejarz, Carl Veller, Raghavendra Gadagkar, Martin A. Nowak, Benjamin Allen 

Publication date: 19 October 2016

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Workers in insect societies are sometimes observed to kill male eggs of other workers, a phenomenon known as worker policing. We perform a mathematical analysis of the evolutionary dynamics of policing. We investigate the selective forces behind policing for both dominant and recessive mutations for different numbers of matings of the queen. The traditional, relatedness-based argument suggests that policing evolves if the queen mates with more than two males, but does not evolve if the queen mates with a single male. We derive precise conditions for the invasion and stability of policing alleles. We find that the relatedness-based argument is not robust with respect to small changes in colony efficiency caused by policing. We also calculate evolutionarily singular strategies and determine when they are evolutionarily stable. We use a population genetics approach that applies to dominant or recessive mutations of any effect size.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1603.05293

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zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary dynamicsnatural selectionmodels/simulationssociobiology

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Animal behavior (92D50)

Cites Work

• The dynamical theory of coevolution: A derivation from stochastic ecological processes
• Adaptive dynamics, a geometrical study of the consequences of nearly faithful reproduction
• Darwinian selection and altruism
• Evolution of cooperation by phenotypic similarity
• Fixation of strategies for an evolutionary game in finite populations
• The evolution of stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
• Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity
• Limitations of inclusive fitness
• Adaptive dynamics and evolutionary stability
• Games on graphs
• A simple model of group selection that cannot be analyzed with inclusive fitness

Cited In (3)

• A stochastic model for evolution of sociality in insects.
• Evolution of eusociality in diploid species
• Colony-level selection in the social insects: Single locus additive and nonadditive models

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