Fixation of strategies for an evolutionary game in finite populations

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Publication:743797

DOI10.1007/S11538-006-9061-4zbMATH Open1296.92238arXivq-bio/0509008OpenAlexW3098458583WikidataQ51929472 ScholiaQ51929472MaRDI QIDQ743797FDOQ743797


Authors: Tibor Antal, István Scheuring Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 30 September 2014

Published in: Bulletin of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: A stochastic evolutionary dynamics of two strategies given by 2 x 2 matrix games is studied in finite populations. We focus on stochastic properties of fixation: how a strategy represented by a single individual wins over the entire population. The process is discussed in the framework of a random walk with arbitrary hopping rates. The time of fixation is found to be identical for both strategies in any particular game. The asymptotic behavior of the fixation time and fixation probabilities in the large population size limit is also discussed. We show that fixation is fast when there is at least one pure evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in the infinite population size limit, while fixation is slow when the ESS is the coexistence of the two strategies.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0509008




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