Evolutionary games with facilitators: when does selection favor cooperation?

DOI10.1016/j.chaos.2013.07.011zbMath1348.91041arXiv1307.4375OpenAlexW2065979424WikidataQ57948917 ScholiaQ57948917MaRDI QIDQ336265

Mauro Mobilia

Publication date: 10 November 2016

Published in: Chaos, Solitons and Fractals (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1307.4375

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (2)

Large fluctuations in anti-coordination games on scale-free graphs ⋮ Critical thresholds of benefit distribution in an extended snowdrift game model

Cites Work

• Fixation of strategies for an evolutionary game in finite populations
• The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
• Pairwise comparison and selection temperature in evolutionary game dynamics
• Game theory and physics
• Large fluctuations and fixation in evolutionary games
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
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