Evolutionary game theory meets social science: is there a unifying rule for human cooperation?

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.02.015zbMath1406.91052OpenAlexW2002060709WikidataQ82954607 ScholiaQ82954607MaRDI QIDQ1716238

Alejandro Rosas

Publication date: 4 February 2019

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.02.015

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitynormsreciprocitypunishmentstrategiesenforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (3)

Hidden patterns of reciprocity ⋮ Evolutionary games in interacting communities ⋮ Evolutionary multiplayer games

Cites Work

• Evolution of generous cooperative norms by cultural group selection
• Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
• The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
• Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation
• The Evolution of Cooperation

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