Extreme selection unifies evolutionary game dynamics in finite and infinite populations

DOI10.1007/s11538-017-0269-2zbMath1368.92123OpenAlexW2597547425WikidataQ47907709 ScholiaQ47907709MaRDI QIDQ2359129

Fabio Dercole, Cristina Vicini, Fabio Della Rossa

Publication date: 27 June 2017

Published in: Bulletin of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11538-017-0269-2

zbMATH Keywords

random walkevolutionary gameinvasionstrong selectionMoran processimitationpairwise comparisonfixation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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