Evolutionary games with affine fitness functions: applications to cancer
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Publication:692096
Abstract: We analyze the dynamics of evolutionary games in which fitness is defined as an affine function of the expected payoff and a constant contribution. The resulting inhomogeneous replicator equation has an homogeneous equivalent with modified payoffs. The affine terms also influence the stochastic dynamics of a two-strategy Moran model of a finite population. We then apply the affine fitness function in a model for tumor-normal cell interactions to determine which are the most successful tumor strategies. In order to analyze the dynamics of concurrent strategies within a tumor population, we extend the model to a three-strategy game involving distinct tumor cell types as well as normal cells. In this model, interaction with normal cells, in combination with an increased constant fitness, is the most effective way of establishing a population of tumor cells in normal tissue.
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