Weak selection helps cheap but harms expensive cooperation in spatial threshold dilemmas

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2021.110995MaRDI QIDQ2115989zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tamás Czárán, István Scheuring

Publication date 15 March 2022

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2021.110995

zbMATH Keywords

nonlinear public goodsspatial patternstochastic replicator dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Problems related to evolution (92D15)

Recommendations

• Spatial evolutionary dynamics produce a negative cooperation-population size relationship
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• The spatial inheritance enhances cooperation in weak prisoner's dilemmas with agents' exponential lifespan
• Impact of self interaction on the evolution of cooperation in social spatial dilemmas

Cites work

• Cooperative success in epithelial public goods games
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Fitness-based models and pairwise comparison models of evolutionary games are typically different—even in unstructured populations
• Fixation of strategies for an evolutionary game in finite populations
• Interface and surface tension in incompressible lattice Boltzmann multiphase model
• Local replicator dynamics: a simple link between deterministic and stochastic models of evolutionary game theory
• Movement patterns, social dynamics, and the evolution of cooperation
• Persistent homology and the shape of evolutionary games
• Review: Game theory of public goods in one-shot social dilemmas without assortment
• Strategy abundance in 2 2 games for arbitrary mutation rates
• The effect of dispersal and neighbourhood in games of cooperation
• The importance of being discrete (and spatial)
• The replicator equation on graphs

Cited in

(1)

• Inertia in spatial public goods games under weak selection

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