Multigame effect in finite populations induces strategy linkage between two games

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2013.12.007zbMATH Open1338.91025arXiv1305.7303OpenAlexW2962873398WikidataQ45843404 ScholiaQ45843404MaRDI QIDQ291601FDOQ291601

Authors: Koh Hashimoto 

Publication date: 10 June 2016

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Evolutionary game dynamics with two 2-strategy games in a finite population has been investigated in this study. Traditionally, frequency-dependent evolutionary dynamics are modeled by deterministic replicator dynamics under the assumption that the population size is infinite. However, in reality, population sizes are finite. Recently, stochastic processes in finite populations have been introduced into evolutionary games in order to study finite size effects in evolutionary game dynamics. However, most of these studies focus on populations playing only single games. In this study, we investigate a finite population with two games and show that a finite population playing two games tends to evolve toward a specific direction to form particular linkages between the strategies of the two games.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1305.7303

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zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theorystochastic dynamicsfinite populationlinkage disequilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cited In (7)

• The effect of perceptions competition and learning costs on cooperation in spatial evolutionary multigames
• Inverse engineering preferences in simple games
• Multigames with voluntary participation on interdependent networks and the evolution of cooperation
• The effect of multigame on cooperation in spatial network
• The evolution of cooperation in spatial multigame with voluntary participation
• Aspiration drives adaptive switching between two different payoff matrices
• Random and non-random mating populations: evolutionary dynamics in meiotic drive

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