Multigame effect in finite populations induces strategy linkage between two games

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.12.007zbMath1338.91025arXiv1305.7303OpenAlexW2962873398WikidataQ45843404 ScholiaQ45843404MaRDI QIDQ291601

Koh Hashimoto

Publication date: 10 June 2016

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1305.7303

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic dynamicsfinite populationevolutionary game theorylinkage disequilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (7)

The evolution of cooperation in spatial multigame with voluntary participation ⋮ Random and non-random mating populations: evolutionary dynamics in meiotic drive ⋮ Aspiration drives adaptive switching between two different payoff matrices ⋮ Inverse engineering preferences in simple games ⋮ Multigames with voluntary participation on interdependent networks and the evolution of cooperation ⋮ The effect of multigame on cooperation in spatial network ⋮ The effect of perceptions competition and learning costs on cooperation in spatial evolutionary multigames

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