A stochastic behavioral model and a `microscopic' foundation of evolutionary game theory

DOI10.1007/BF00133171zbMath0848.90147arXivcond-mat/9805340OpenAlexW3121849933WikidataQ56603613 ScholiaQ56603613MaRDI QIDQ1915819

Dirk Helbing

Publication date: 9 October 1996

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/9805340

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theorymean value equationscovariance equationsimitative processessocial self-organization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

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