Social control and the social contract: the emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action

DOI10.1007/S13235-010-0001-4zbMATH Open1214.91011OpenAlexW2127446434MaRDI QIDQ545659FDOQ545659

Hannelore De Silva, Arne Traulsen, Karl Sigmund, Christoph Hauert

Publication date: 22 June 2011

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-010-0001-4

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zbMATH Keywords

cooperationevolutionary game theorysocial dilemmapublic goods gamescostly punishmentvoluntary interactions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Evolutionary games (91A22) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

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• Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
• Iterated prisoner's dilemma in an asocial world dominated by loners, not by defectors

Cited In (13)

• Games of corruption in preventing the overuse of common-pool resources
• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with pool exclusion strategies
• Games of corruption: how to suppress illegal logging
• Governance of risky public goods under the threat of ostracism
• Imitating winner or sympathizing loser? Quadratic effects on cooperative behavior in prisoners' dilemma games
• Fractional punishment of free riders to improve cooperation in optional public good games
• The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation
• Dynamics and Stability of Collective Action Norms
• Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions
• Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games
• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators
• Predicting peak of participants in collective action
• Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds

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