Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2014.04.019MaRDI QIDQ2415549zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Sarah Schoenmakers, Christian Hilbe, Bernd Blasius, Arne Traulsen

Publication date 23 May 2019

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.04.019

zbMATH Keywords

evolution of cooperationinstitution formationpublic goods gametragedy of the commons

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites work

• Cooperation and evolutionary dynamics in the public goods game with institutional incentives
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• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• How small are small mutation rates?
• Imitation processes with small mutations
• Leaving the loners alone: evolution of cooperation in the presence of antisocial punishment
• Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games
• Punishment can promote defection in group-structured populations
• Review: Game theory of public goods in one-shot social dilemmas without assortment
• Social control and the social contract: the emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action
• The calculus of selfishness.
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• The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation
• The logic of animal conflict
• The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
• The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
• Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment

Cited in

(30)

• Benefits of intervention in spatial public goods games
• Should law keep pace with society? Relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods
• Commitment to cooperation and peer punishment: its evolution
• Characteristics of the evolution of cooperation by the probabilistic peer-punishment based on the difference of payoff
• The signaling value of punishing norm-breakers and rewarding norm-followers
• The effect of sanctions on the evolution of cooperation in linear division of labor
• Signals for reliability: A possibly harmful institution?
• Replicator dynamics for public goods game with resource allocation in large populations
• Synergy and discount of punishment in the public goods game
• Preference reversal and the evolution of cooperation
• Game theory and the evolution of cooperation
• Evolution of cooperation in public goods games with stochastic opting-out
• Evolution of cooperation with peer punishment under prospect theory
• A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity
• Particle swarm intelligence and the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game with punishment
• Evolutionary dynamics of a 3-strategy game: cooperator, defector and costly cooperative loner strategic types
• Stable polymorphism of cooperators and punishers in a public goods game
• Third-party punishment as a costly signal of high continuation probabilities in repeated games
• The public goods game with shared punishment cost in well-mixed and structured populations
• Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games
• The emergence and implementation of pool exclusion in spatial public goods game with heterogeneous ability-to-pay
• When punishers might be loved: fourth-party choices and third-party punishment in a delegation game
• The evolution of coercive institutional punishment
• Complex traffic flow that allows as well as hampers lane-changing intrinsically contains social-dilemma structures
• Social control and the social contract: the emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action
• The shirker's dilemma and the prospect of cooperation in large groups
• Cooperation under endogenous punishment in the spatial public goods game
• Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation
• Governance of risky public goods under graduated punishment
• Sanctions as revelation regimes

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