Signals for reliability: A possibly harmful institution?

MaRDI QIDQ1854664zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Friedel Bolle

Publication date 2002

Published in CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationsignals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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