Leaving the loners alone: evolution of cooperation in the presence of antisocial punishment

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2012.05.011MaRDI QIDQ292723zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Julián Garcia, Arne Traulsen

Publication date 9 June 2016

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-D2EC-B

zbMATH Keywords

antisocial punishmentcollective actioncooperationpunishment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Evolutionary games (91A22) Public goods (91B18) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

Recommendations

• Evolution of cooperation in public goods games
• Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games
• Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible
• The impact of loners' participation willingness on cooperation in voluntary prisoner's dilemma
• Punishment can promote defection in group-structured populations

Cites work

• Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity
• Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3194920 (Why is no real title available?)
• Imitation processes with small mutations
• The calculus of selfishness.
• Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment

Cited in

(21)

• Should law keep pace with society? Relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods
• Cooperate without looking in a non-repeated game
• Logit selection promotes cooperation in voluntary public goods game
• The impact of loners' participation willingness on cooperation in voluntary prisoner's dilemma
• Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation
• Evolution of cooperation with peer punishment under prospect theory
• The evolutionary public goods game model with punishment mechanism in an activity-driven network
• Evolutionary dynamics of a 3-strategy game: cooperator, defector and costly cooperative loner strategic types
• Conditional rehabilitation of cooperation under strategic uncertainty
• Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
• Third-party punishment as a costly signal of high continuation probabilities in repeated games
• Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions
• The construction of peer punishment preference: how central power shapes prosocial and antisocial punishment behaviors
• Evolution of cooperation in public goods games
• Cooperation and punishment in community-structured populations with migration
• The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation
• Complexity of behavioural strategies and cooperation in the optional public goods game
• Stochastic stability and disagreements between dynamics
• Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible
• Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation
• Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games

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