Leaving the loners alone: evolution of cooperation in the presence of antisocial punishment

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.05.011zbMath1337.91020OpenAlexW2070193831WikidataQ45950933 ScholiaQ45950933MaRDI QIDQ292723

Arne Traulsen, Julián García

Publication date: 9 June 2016

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-D2EC-B

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationcollective actionpunishmentantisocial punishment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Public goods (91B18) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (16)

Cooperation and punishment in community-structured populations with migration ⋮ Should law keep pace with society? Relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods ⋮ Cooperate without looking in a non-repeated game ⋮ Third-party punishment as a costly signal of high continuation probabilities in repeated games ⋮ Evolution of cooperation with peer punishment under prospect theory ⋮ Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions ⋮ Complexity of behavioural strategies and cooperation in the optional public goods game ⋮ The construction of peer punishment preference: how central power shapes prosocial and antisocial punishment behaviors ⋮ The evolutionary public goods game model with punishment mechanism in an activity-driven network ⋮ The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation ⋮ Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of a 3-strategy game: cooperator, defector and costly cooperative loner strategic types ⋮ Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible ⋮ Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation ⋮ Conditional rehabilitation of cooperation under strategic uncertainty ⋮ Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Imitation processes with small mutations
• Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity
• Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games
• Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
• The Calculus of Selfishness

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