Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation
From MaRDI portal
Publication:739786
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.09.009zbMath1343.91030OpenAlexW1790806609WikidataQ50558976 ScholiaQ50558976MaRDI QIDQ739786
Shiping Gao, Suli Nie, Te Wu, Long Wang
Publication date: 19 August 2016
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.09.009
Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Related Items
Various error settings bring different noise-driven effects on network reciprocity in spatial prisoner's dilemma, Preference reversal and the evolution of cooperation, How ``punishing evil and promoting good promotes cooperation in social dilemma
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Evolutionary games in deme structured, finite populations
- Leaving the loners alone: evolution of cooperation in the presence of antisocial punishment
- Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible
- Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with multiple strategies
- The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity
- Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
- Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails
- Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions
- The conflict of social norms may cause the collapse of cooperation: indirect reciprocity with opposing attitudes towards in-group favoritism
- The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
- Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
- Lab Experiments for the Study of Social-Ecological Systems
- Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
- Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions
