Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation
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Publication:739786
DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2015.09.009zbMATH Open1343.91030OpenAlexW1790806609WikidataQ50558976 ScholiaQ50558976MaRDI QIDQ739786FDOQ739786
Authors: Shiping Gao, Te Wu, Suli Nie, Long Wang 
Publication date: 19 August 2016
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.09.009
Recommendations
- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation driven by incentives
- Conditional neutral punishment promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible
- The construction of peer punishment preference: how central power shapes prosocial and antisocial punishment behaviors
- Punishment in the form of shared cost promotes altruism in the cooperative dilemma games
Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Cooperative games (91A12) Noncooperative games (91A10) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Cites Work
- Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with multiple strategies
- The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity
- Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
- Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails
- Evolutionary games in deme structured, finite populations
- Leaving the loners alone: evolution of cooperation in the presence of antisocial punishment
- Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare
- Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible
- The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
- Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions
- Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions
- The conflict of social norms may cause the collapse of cooperation: indirect reciprocity with opposing attitudes towards in-group favoritism
- Lab experiments for the study of social-ecological systems
Cited In (22)
- How ``punishing evil and promoting good promotes cooperation in social dilemma
- The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher
- Punishment in the form of shared cost promotes altruism in the cooperative dilemma games
- Various error settings bring different noise-driven effects on network reciprocity in spatial prisoner's dilemma
- The Use and Misuse of Coordinated Punishments*
- Impact of strategy-neutral rewarding on the evolution of cooperative behavior
- Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: comparison of centralized punishment institutions
- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation driven by incentives
- The construction of peer punishment preference: how central power shapes prosocial and antisocial punishment behaviors
- Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors on the evolution of cooperation
- Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment
- Coordinated and uncoordinated punishment in a team investment game
- Evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks: the impact of asymmetric punishment
- Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible
- The role of visibility on third party punishment actions for the enforcement of social norms
- Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
- Cultural coevolution of norm adoption and enforcement when punishers are rewarded or non-punishers are punished
- Legitimate punishment, feedback, and the enforcement of cooperation
- Hierarchy, power, and strategies to promote cooperation in social dilemmas
- In the long-run we are all dead: on the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments
- Preference reversal and the evolution of cooperation
- Effects of individual and collective decision rule on cooperation in public goods game
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