In the long-run we are all dead: on the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments
From MaRDI portal
Publication:892869
DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0884-5zbMATH Open1341.91032OpenAlexW2248962743MaRDI QIDQ892869FDOQ892869
Authors: Dirk Engelmann, N. Nikiforakis 
Publication date: 12 November 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/32651/1/Engelmann_%26_Nikiforakis.pdf
Recommendations
- Evolution of cooperation with peer punishment under prospect theory
- Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation
- On the design of peer punishment experiments
- Self-governance in generalized exchange. A laboratory experiment on the structural embeddedness of peer punishment
- Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment
- Commitment to cooperation and peer punishment: its evolution
- Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: comparison of centralized punishment institutions
- Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible
- Why punish? Norms and revenge in an experimental game
Cites Work
- Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations
- Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
- Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare
- Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment
- A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments
Cited In (2)
Uses Software
This page was built for publication: In the long-run we are all dead: on the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q892869)
