Limited-tenure concessions for collective goods
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Publication:2097989
Recommendations
- Cooperative provision of indivisible public goods
- Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered
- Social Welfare in a Common Property Oligopoly
- On the sustainability of common property resources
- Natural resource use with limited-tenure property rights
- Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
- Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 16102
- Maximin share guarantee for goods with positive externalities
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 952971
Cites work
- A folk theorem for stochastic games
- Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
- In the long-run we are all dead: on the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments
- Landing fees vs. harvest quotas with uncertain fish stocks
- Microeconomic theory
- Natural resource use with limited-tenure property rights
- Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- Optimal escapement levels in stochastic and deterministic harvesting models
- Optimal harvesting of stochastic spatial resources
- Optimal spatial management of renewable resources: matching policy scope to ecosystem scale
- Public goods, growth, and welfare
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