Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.09.033MaRDI QIDQ2444167zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Patrick W. Schmitz

Publication date 8 April 2014

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/41730/1/MPRA_paper_41730.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsownershipincomplete contractsinvestment incentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(9)

• Limited-tenure concessions for collective goods
• Location and ownership of public goods
• Control rights in complex partnerships revisited
• Opportunism and the Dynamics of Incomplete Contracts
• When should the government own the physical assets needed to provide public goods?
• Government versus private ownership of public goods
• Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered
• Optimal ownership of public goods in the presence of transaction costs
• Neutrality and the private provision of public goods with incomplete information

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