Confining the Coase theorem: contracting, ownership, and free-riding

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDW001MaRDI QIDQ4610795zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Tore Ellingsen, Elena Paltseva

Publication date 23 January 2019

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdw001

zbMATH Keywords

contractingownershipproperty rightsrenegotiation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Revisiting the Coase theorem
• A reconsideration of the problem of social cost: Free riders and monopolists
• An experimental study of the effect of private information in the Coase theorem
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Cited in

(14)

• Risk sharing in Coasean contracts.
• On the Coase theorem and coalitional stability: The principle of equal relative concession
• A reconsideration of the problem of social cost: Free riders and monopolists
• Optimal ownership of public goods in the presence of transaction costs
• Agreements with reciprocity: co-financing and MOUs
• Revisiting the Coase theorem
• Stable agreements through liability rules: a multi-choice game approach to the social cost problem
• Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods
• Coercion, contract and the limits of the market
• The market for conservation and other hostages
• An experimental study of the effect of private information in the Coase theorem
• Climate payments: a Coase theorem
• Contractual chains
• Costly enforcement of property rights and the Coase theorem

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