Climate payments: a Coase theorem

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2025.106032MaRDI QIDQ6933957zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors P. Dutta, Roy Radner

Publication date 3 September 2025

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JET.2025.106032

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cites work

• Asynchronous games with transfers: uniqueness and optimality
• Capital growth in a global warming model: Will China and India sign a climate treaty?
• Climate contracts: a game of emissions, investments, negotiations, and renegotiations
• Common Agency
• Confining the Coase theorem: contracting, ownership, and free-riding
• Games Played Through Agents
• How different can strategic models be?
• Markov-perfect Nash equilibria in a class of resource games
• Markovian equilibrium in a class of stochastic games: Existence theorems for discounted and undiscounted models
• Perfect equilibrium in non-randomized strategies in a class of symmetric dynamic games
• Population growth and technological change in a global warming model
• The joint exploitation of a productive asset: A game-theoretic approach
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

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