Perfect equilibrium in non-randomized strategies in a class of symmetric dynamic games

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90107-5zbMath0684.90109OpenAlexW2062914483MaRDI QIDQ1825779

Rangarajan K. Sundaram

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90107-5

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gameperfect equilibriumcommon-property resourcescompact state spacedeterministic transition functionexistence of a symmetric stationary equilibriuminstantaneous utility functionoligopolistic exploitation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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