Can players avoid the tragedy of the commons in a joint debt game?

DOI10.1007/S00182-020-00722-4MaRDI QIDQ2021807zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hiromasa Takahashi, Toru Takemoto, Akihiro Suzuki

Publication date 27 April 2021

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00722-4

zbMATH Keywords

common resourcedynamic gameGreek overborrowingjoint debtstragedy of the commons

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Financial networks (including contagion, systemic risk, regulation) (91G45)

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Cites work

• Generalized Instrumental Variables Estimation of Nonlinear Rational Expectations Models
• Perfect equilibrium in non-randomized strategies in a class of symmetric dynamic games

Cited in

(1)

• Do social status seeking behaviors worsen the tragedy of the commons?

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