Second best equilibria for games fo joint exploitation of a productive asset

DOI10.1007/BF01211439zbMath0809.90015MaRDI QIDQ1338076

Aldo Rustichini

Publication date: 28 March 1995

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

constrained efficiencyequilibria in stationary strategiesjoint exploitation of a productive asset

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (7)

The joint exploitation of a productive asset: A game-theoretic approach ⋮ Cooperation in the commons with unobservable actions ⋮ Capital growth in a global warming model: Will China and India sign a climate treaty? ⋮ Dynamic Games with an Application to Climate Change Models ⋮ Social conflict and growth. ⋮ Cooperation in the commons ⋮ Incentive compatibility constraints and dynamic programming in continuous time

Cites Work

• Vintage capital, investment, and growth
• The joint exploitation of a productive asset: A game-theoretic approach
• Markovian equilibrium in a class of stochastic games: Existence theorems for discounted and undiscounted models
• Perfect equilibrium in non-randomized strategies in a class of symmetric dynamic games
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Second best equilibria for games fo joint exploitation of a productive asset