Cooperation in the commons with unobservable actions

DOI10.1016/j.jeem.2007.08.001zbMath1134.91341OpenAlexW2104874588MaRDI QIDQ2426920

Nori Tarui, Stephen Polasky, Greg Ellis, Charles F. Mason

Publication date: 14 May 2008

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.economics.hawaii.edu/research/workingpapers/WP_07-11.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamescooperationsubgame perfectionrenewable resourcescommon property resourcesunobservable actionsworst perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (4)

The survival of the conformist: social pressure and renewable resource management ⋮ International fisheries agreements with a shifting stock ⋮ A free lunch in the commons ⋮ Regulation of fisheries bycatch with common-pool output quotas

Cites Work

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• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
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