International fisheries agreements with a shifting stock
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Recommendations
- WHEN TO RATIFY AN ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENT: THE CASE OF HIGH SEAS FISHERIES
- On shared use of renewable stocks
- International fish wars: The strategic roles for fleet licensing and effort subsidies
- SEQUENTIAL FISHING: COOPERATIVE AND NON‐COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIA
- Keep it in house or sell it abroad? A framework to evaluate fairness
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3811274 (Why is no real title available?)
- A survey of dynamical games in economics.
- Cooperation in the commons with unobservable actions
- Cooperative and non-cooperative harvesting in a stochastic sequential fishery.
- Random penalties and renewable resources: A mechanism to reach optimal landings in fisheries
- Strategic exploitation of a common resource under environmental risk
- Strategic exploitation of a common-property resource under rational learning about its reproduction
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