International fisheries agreements with a shifting stock

DOI10.1007/S13235-016-0184-4zbMATH Open1391.91136OpenAlexW642241676WikidataQ112607545 ScholiaQ112607545MaRDI QIDQ2397930FDOQ2397930

Authors: Florian K. Diekert, Emmi Nieminen 

Publication date: 14 August 2017

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10852/62409

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zbMATH Keywords

climate changedynamic gamerenewable resourcesinternational environmental agreementsregime shift

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25)

Cites Work

• A survey of dynamical games in economics.
• Cooperation in the commons with unobservable actions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Strategic exploitation of a common resource under environmental risk
• Cooperative and non-cooperative harvesting in a stochastic sequential fishery.
• Strategic exploitation of a common-property resource under rational learning about its reproduction
• Random penalties and renewable resources: A mechanism to reach optimal landings in fisheries

Cited In (3)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the Economics of International Fisheries
• Keep it in house or sell it abroad? A framework to evaluate fairness

Uses Software

• R

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