A free lunch in the commons

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2010.11.002zbMATH Open1215.91050OpenAlexW3124284834MaRDI QIDQ545129FDOQ545129

Stephen W. Salant, Matthew J. Kotchen

Publication date: 22 June 2011

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2010.11.002

zbMATH Keywords

welfareprofitscommon-pool resourcespolicycournot oligopoly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Cooperation in the commons
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Putting free-riding to work: A partnership solution to the common-property problem
• Comparative Statics for Oligopoly
• Cooperation in the commons with unobservable actions
• The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.
• When Are Nash Equilibria Independent of the Distribution of Agents' Characteristics?
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (1)

• Common pool resource appropriation under costly cooperation

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