NATURAL RESOURCE EXPLOITATION UNDER COMMON PROPERTY RIGHTS

DOI10.1111/J.1939-7445.2003.TB00102.XzbMath1181.91242OpenAlexW1980899428MaRDI QIDQ4458260

Michael R. Caputo, Dean Lueck

Publication date: 17 March 2004

Published in: Natural Resource Modeling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1939-7445.2003.tb00102.x

zbMATH Keywords

differential gamesharvestingsteady statecommon property rightsexclusive resource use

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (1)

A qualitative characterization of symmetric open-loop Nash equilibria in discounted infinite horizon differential games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Further properties of nonzero-sum differential games
• Open Access and Extinction
• An Open-Access Fishery with Rational Expectations
• GAME-THEORETIC RESOURCE MODELING
• THE QUALITATIVE CONTENT OF RENEWABLE RESOURCE MODELS
• Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games

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