Appropriation of Common Access Natural Resources Through Exploration: The Relevance of the Open-Loop Concept

DOI10.2307/2526668MaRDI QIDQ3783799zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ernst Mohr

Publication date 1988

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2526668

zbMATH Keywords

open-loop equilibriumcommon property issuesconsistency rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economic growth models (91B62)

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Cited in

(12)

• A note on Clemhout and Wan's dynamic games of common property resources
• Private storage of common property
• The commons with capital markets
• Dynamic common property resources and environmental problems
• Competitive versus efficient extraction of a common property resource: The groundwater case
• NATURAL RESOURCE EXPLOITATION UNDER COMMON PROPERTY RIGHTS
• The economic dynamics of antibiotic efficacy under open access
• Exploration for nonrenewable resources in a dynamic oligopoly: an Arrovian result
• Putting free-riding to work: A partnership solution to the common-property problem
• Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
• The uncommon insight of Elinor Ostrom
• The envelope theorem for locally differentiable Nash equilibria of finite horizon differential games

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