Private storage of common property

DOI10.1006/JEEM.2000.1184MaRDI QIDQ697509zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gérard Gaudet, Michel Moreaux, Stephen W. Salant

Publication date 17 September 2002

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.2000.1184

zbMATH Keywords

tragedy of the commonsspeculative attacksfree accessmaximum efficient rate of extraction (MER)rule of capturetotal catch quotas

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cited in

(6)

• The commons with capital markets
• Competitive versus efficient extraction of a common property resource: The groundwater case
• Monopoly extraction of a nonrenewable resource facing capacity constrained renewable competition
• Networks of common property resources
• The effects of periodic quotas limiting the stock of imports of durables
• Free access vs private ownership: A comparison

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