Competitive versus efficient extraction of a common property resource: The groundwater case
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Recommendations
- Groundwater extraction among overlapping generations: a differential game approach
- Competition and cooperation in the exploitation of the groundwater resource
- NATURAL RESOURCE EXPLOITATION UNDER COMMON PROPERTY RIGHTS
- Private storage of common property
- Appropriation of Common Access Natural Resources Through Exploration: The Relevance of the Open-Loop Concept
Cites work
- An Open-Access Fishery with Rational Expectations
- Capacity Investment, Preemption and Commitment in an Infinite Horizon Model
- Dynamic common property resources and environmental problems
- Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices
- Inefficiency of credible strategies in oligopolistic resource markets with uncertainty
- Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
- The buffer value of groundwater with stochastic surface water supplies
- The economics of conjunctive groundwater management with stochastic surface supplies
- Uncertainty and irreversibility in groundwater resource management
Cited in
(17)- Some reflections on past and future of nonlinear dynamics in economics and finance
- Competition and cooperation in the exploitation of the groundwater resource
- The intrinsic comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Nash equilibria of autonomous and exponentially discounted infinite horizon differential games
- Groundwater extraction among overlapping generations: a differential game approach
- Inter-temporal decisions, optimal taxation and non-compliant behaviors in groundwater management
- An evolutionary game on compliant and non-compliant firms in groundwater exploitation
- Groundwater exploitation and illegal behaviors in a differential game
- Water taxes and fines imposed on legal and illegal firms exploiting groudwater
- NATURAL RESOURCE EXPLOITATION UNDER COMMON PROPERTY RIGHTS
- Monopoly Power and Distribution in Fragmented Markets: The Case of Groundwater
- Optimal allocation of groundwater resources: managing water quantity and quality
- Groundwater management and illegality in a differential-evolutionary framework
- A differential game for optimal water price management
- Dynamic groundwater resource management using differential game theory and finite difference methods: a multi-firm competitive framework
- Private storage of common property
- A discrete-time dynamic game of seasonal water allocation
- Developments in differential game theory and numerical methods: Economic and management applications
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