Groundwater extraction among overlapping generations: a differential game approach
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2026524
DOI10.1007/s10203-020-00292-wzbMath1465.91070OpenAlexW3041213892MaRDI QIDQ2026524
Lucia Maddalena, Giovanni Villani, Marta Biancardi
Publication date: 19 May 2021
Published in: Decisions in Economics and Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10203-020-00292-w
Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
Related Items (4)
Groundwater exploitation and illegal behaviors in a differential game ⋮ Groundwater management and illegality in a differential-evolutionary framework ⋮ Water taxes and fines imposed on legal and illegal firms exploiting groudwater ⋮ Inter-temporal decisions, optimal taxation and non-compliant behaviors in groundwater management
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Dynamic common property resources and environmental problems
- Constrained game formulations and interpretations for data envelopment analysis
- A game theoretic approach to measuring efficiency
- Equilibria in a stochastic resource management game under imperfect information
- General dynamics in overlapping generations models
- Competition and cooperation in the exploitation of the groundwater resource
- Intertemporal preferences and intergenerational equity considerations in optimal resource harvesting
- Inter- and intragenerational renewable resource extraction
- Stochastic differential game model of a common property fishery
- On the Economics of International Fisheries
- Competitive versus efficient extraction of a common property resource: The groundwater case
This page was built for publication: Groundwater extraction among overlapping generations: a differential game approach