Groundwater management and illegality in a differential-evolutionary framework
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Publication:6067191
DOI10.1007/s10287-023-00449-zOpenAlexW4360613528MaRDI QIDQ6067191
Giovanni Villani, Marta Biancardi, Gianluca Iannucci
Publication date: 14 December 2023
Published in: Computational Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10287-023-00449-z
replicator dynamicsgroundwater managementleader-follower differential gameunauthorized water extractionillegal behaviors
Cites Work
- A dynamical characterization of evolutionarily stable states
- Competition and cooperation in the exploitation of the groundwater resource
- The spatially dominant equilibrium of a game
- Optimal adaptation strategies to face shocks on groundwater resources
- Groundwater extraction among overlapping generations: a differential game approach
- Inter-temporal decisions, optimal taxation and non-compliant behaviors in groundwater management
- An evolutionary game on compliant and non-compliant firms in groundwater exploitation
- Groundwater exploitation and illegal behaviors in a differential game
- Competitive versus efficient extraction of a common property resource: The groundwater case
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