The uncommon insight of Elinor Ostrom

DOI10.1111/J.1467-9442.2010.01608.XMaRDI QIDQ3065334zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Theodore C. Bergstrom

Publication date 5 January 2011

Published in Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2010.01608.x

zbMATH Keywords

common property resourcesexternalitiesproperty rightstragedy of the commonsresource economicspolitical institutionsinstitutional economicsElinor OstromNobel laureatetragedy of anticommons

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History of mathematics in the 20th century (01A60) History of game theory, economics, and finance (91-03)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading

Cited in

(2)

• A simple model to bridge Hardin's tragedy and Ostrom's comity
• The economics of eminent domain: private property, public use, and just compensation.

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