When additional resource stocks reduce welfare

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2009.08.001MaRDI QIDQ994091zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hassan Benchekroun, Alex Halsema, Cees Withagen

Publication date 17 September 2010

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2009.08.001

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumnonrenewable resourcesdominant firm versus fringe

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Welfare economics (91B15)

Recommendations

• Social Welfare in a Common Property Oligopoly
• A free lunch in the commons
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Cites work

• Entry Deterrence in the Commons
• Entry deterrence and overexploitation of the fishery
• Heterogeneous Demand and Order of Resource Extraction
• On Two Folk Theorems Concerning the Extraction of Exhaustible Resources
• On nonrenewable resource oligopolies: the asymmetric case
• Potential competition and the monopoly price of an exhaustible resource
• Strong time-consistency in the cartel-versus-fringe model

Cited in

(9)

• A coalitional differential game of vaccine producers
• A coalitional differential game of vaccine producers
• Monopoly, unilateral climate policies and limit pricing
• An oligopoly-fringe non-renewable resource game in the presence of a renewable substitute
• Battle for climate and scarcity rents: beyond the linear-quadratic case
• Dynamic games between firms and infinitely lived consumers: a review of the literature
• An oligopoly-fringe model with HARA preferences
• Dynamic games in the economics of natural resources: a survey
• Should the global community welcome new oil discoveries?

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