When additional resource stocks reduce welfare
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Publication:994091
DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2009.08.001zbMATH Open1194.91140OpenAlexW2110464358MaRDI QIDQ994091FDOQ994091
Cees Withagen, Hassan Benchekroun, Alex Halsema
Publication date: 17 September 2010
Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2009.08.001
Recommendations
Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Welfare economics (91B15)
Cites Work
- On nonrenewable resource oligopolies: the asymmetric case
- Strong time-consistency in the cartel-versus-fringe model
- Entry deterrence and overexploitation of the fishery
- Entry Deterrence in the Commons
- On Two Folk Theorems Concerning the Extraction of Exhaustible Resources
- Heterogeneous Demand and Order of Resource Extraction
- Potential competition and the monopoly price of an exhaustible resource
Cited In (9)
- Battle for climate and scarcity rents: beyond the linear-quadratic case
- Dynamic games between firms and infinitely lived consumers: a review of the literature
- Should the global community welcome new oil discoveries?
- Dynamic games in the economics of natural resources: a survey
- A coalitional differential game of vaccine producers
- Monopoly, unilateral climate policies and limit pricing
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- An oligopoly-fringe model with HARA preferences
- An oligopoly-fringe non-renewable resource game in the presence of a renewable substitute
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