Battle for climate and scarcity rents: beyond the linear-quadratic case

DOI10.1007/S13235-015-0154-2zbMath1348.91223OpenAlexW1503423700WikidataQ28597136 ScholiaQ28597136MaRDI QIDQ257019

Mark Kagan, Frederick van der Ploeg, Cees A. A. M. Withagen

Publication date: 15 March 2016

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0154-2

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencydifferential gamecarbon taxclimate rentexhaustible resourcesHARA production functionsHotelling ruleopen-loop Nash equilibriumsubgame-perfect Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (3)

An oligopoly-fringe model with HARA preferences ⋮ On agreements in a nonrenewable resource market: a cooperative differential game approach ⋮ Sharing the global outcomes of finite natural resource exploitation: a dynamic coalitional stability perspective

Cites Work

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• Do multiple Nash equilibria in Markov strategies mitigate the tragedy of the commons?
• On nonrenewable resource oligopolies: the asymmetric case
• Trade with polluting nonrenewable resources
• Can carbon tax eat OPEC's rents?
• Optimal Taxes on Fossil Fuel in General Equilibrium

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