Do multiple Nash equilibria in Markov strategies mitigate the tragedy of the commons?
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Publication:1027442
DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2006.12.009zbMath1163.91323OpenAlexW2070253708WikidataQ59212020 ScholiaQ59212020MaRDI QIDQ1027442
Publication date: 1 July 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2006.12.009
Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
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