Do multiple Nash equilibria in Markov strategies mitigate the tragedy of the commons?
DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2006.12.009zbMATH Open1163.91323OpenAlexW2070253708WikidataQ59212020 ScholiaQ59212020MaRDI QIDQ1027442FDOQ1027442
Authors: Franz Wirl 
Publication date: 1 July 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2006.12.009
Recommendations
Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23)
Cites Work
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- International pollution control: Cooperative versus noncooperative strategies
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- Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models
- Characterization of Markovian equilibria in a class of differential games
- The tragedy of the commons?
- Sur la gestion des Monopoles Publics astreints a l'equilibre budgetaire
Cited In (17)
- Production-based pollution versus deforestation: optimal policy with state-independent and-dependent environmental absorption efficiency restoration process
- Battle for climate and scarcity rents: beyond the linear-quadratic case
- Selection of a Markov perfect Nash equilibrium in a class of differential games
- Non-linear strategies in a linear quadratic differential game
- The tragedy of the commons?
- Population growth and Nash equilibria under viability constraints in the commons
- Dynamic corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies in oligopoly
- Dynamic nonpoint-source pollution control policy: ambient transfers and uncertainty
- Social capital and the status externality
- Do social status seeking behaviors worsen the tragedy of the commons?
- Global warming with green and brown consumers
- Indeterminacy and history dependence of strategically interacting players
- Groundwater usage and strategic complements. I. (Instrumental Variables)
- Carbon tax and OPEC's rents under a ceiling constraint
- A review of tipping points and precaution using HJB equations
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Transboundary pollution control and environmental absorption efficiency management
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