Global Warming with Green and Brown Consumers

DOI10.1111/j.1467-9442.2011.01677.xzbMath1248.91072OpenAlexW2124802713WikidataQ59211999 ScholiaQ59211999MaRDI QIDQ3166538

Franz Wirl

Publication date: 12 October 2012

Published in: The Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2011.01677.x

zbMATH Keywords

differential gamestock externality(linear) Markov strategiesGreen versus Brown preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Related Items (1)

Dynamic game of international pollution control with general oligopolistic equilibrium: Neary meets Dockner and Long

Cites Work

• Regulation, reputation, and environmental risk
• Social interactions within a dynamic competitive economy
• Non-linear strategies in a linear quadratic differential game
• Do multiple Nash equilibria in Markov strategies mitigate the tragedy of the commons?
• International pollution control: Cooperative versus noncooperative strategies
• Trade with polluting nonrenewable resources
• Can carbon tax eat OPEC's rents?
• Pigouvian taxation of energy for flow and stock externalities and strategic, noncompetitive energy pricing
• Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models

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