Carbon Tax and OPEC’s Rents Under a Ceiling Constraint*

DOI10.1111/j.1467-9442.2011.01678.xzbMath1248.91067OpenAlexW3022418112MaRDI QIDQ3166535

Lionel Ragot, Rémy Dullieux, Katheline Schubert

Publication date: 12 October 2012

Published in: The Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00976591/file/RDLRKS_final.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

differential gamesnon-renewable resourcesglobal warmingnon-linear strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cites Work

• Welfare implications of leadership in a resource market under bilateral monopoly
• Nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices
• A Hotelling model with a ceiling on the stock of pollution
• Non-linear strategies in a linear quadratic differential game
• Do multiple Nash equilibria in Markov strategies mitigate the tragedy of the commons?
• Trade with polluting nonrenewable resources
• Can carbon tax eat OPEC's rents?
• Pigouvian taxation of energy for flow and stock externalities and strategic, noncompetitive energy pricing